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It is a common assumption that Chinese intellectuals, how-ever critical of their government, its institutions, and itspolicies, are unreceptive to calls for greater self-govern-
ment, much less independence, in China’s autonomous
regions, most notably Tibet and Xinjiang. (1) While one could
argue that Tibetan culture has, to an extent, exerted a form
of attraction on critical minds in China in recent years (prob-
ably following a similar trend in the West), Uyghur culture
and the political situation of Xinjiang do not seem present on
their radar screens at all. An interesting exception is therefore
represented by Wang Lixiong’s book on Xinjiang, recently
published in Taiwan, the title of which can be rendered as
My Far West, Your East Turkistan. Wang Lixiong is no
newcomer to the question, having devoted the past two
decades to researching and reflecting on the place of “ethnic
minorities” in China’s political system, in particular in view of
its possible democratisation, although he no longer holds any
official “status” to carry out research since his much-publi-
cised resignation from the Writers’ Association in 2001.
Born in 1953 in Changchun into a family originally from
Shandong, Wang Lixiong underwent rural re-education dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution. His father, a Soviet-educated
engineer, committed suicide (or was possibly killed) in 1968
(see p. 43 (2)), and his mother was sentenced to re-education
through labour. After returning from the country and work-
ing in a factory, Wang took part in the Democracy Wall
movement in 1978 and settled in Beijing. In the 1980s he
travelled around the Tibetan areas of the upper Yangtze and
began writing on Tibet. After 1989, he published the “polit-
ical fantasy” novel Huang Huo (Yellow Peril or Yellow
Disaster) under the name Baomi (1991). (3) This novel,
although fiction, contains all the themes that Wang has been
interested in and has explored in his political writings: a
looming demographic and energy crisis threatening the envi-
ronment, nuclear war triggered by sensitive technologies
falling into the wrong hands, and perhaps most importantly,
the idea that the democratisation process could go horribly
wrong and give rise to a fascist regime in China. 
Wang remained active in the 1990s, creating the environ-
mental association Friends of Nature (Ziran zhi you) in
1994, and researching and writing a
book-length study of Tibet, published
in 1998 under the title Sky Burial:
The Fate of Tibet (Tianzang: Xizang
de mingyun). In a follow-up to the
book, he met the Dalai Lama (in the
United States in 2001) for a series of
talks, published in 2002 under the
title Dialogue with the Dalai Lama
(Yu Dalai Lama duihua). He has ini-
tiated two important petitions, one in
favour of Tenzin Delek Rinpoche, a
Tibetan lama accused of planning a
terrorist attack in 2002, and another
calling for an independent investiga-
tion and peaceful negotiations after
the violent uprising in Lhasa in March
2008. During this period, his reflec-
tions on how to implement democracy
in China also took a more conceptual
turn in several of his essays: Dissolving power: a System of
Gradual Election by Tiers (Rongjie quanli: Zhu ceng di
xuan zhi, 1998), followed by Progressive democracy:
China’s Third Way (Dijin minzhu: Zhongguo de di san tiao
daolu, 2004, expanded in 2006). 
Wang Lixiong first began to study Xinjiang in 1999, when
he travelled there to prepare research for a book along the
lines of Sky Burial. He was arrested for photocopying an
internal publication, stamped as “secret,” on the Xinjiang
Production and Construction Corps (the notorious bingtu-
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S E B A ST I A N  V E G  
1. In this paper, the name “Xinjiang” is used to refer to the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (Xinjiang Weiwu’er zizhi qu) or XUAR, as this is the form used
by Wang Lixiong (Uyghur groups usually prefer XUAR or East Turkestan). I would
like to thank William Nee for his very helpful comments and criticism. 
2. All page numbers in this format refer to Wang Lixiong, Wo de Xiyu, ni de Dong Tu,
Taipei, Dakuai Wenhua (Locus Publishing), 2007. All translations are my own.
3. Baomi [Wang Lixiong], Huanghuo, Taipei, Fengyun shidai, 1991. English translation:
Wang Lixiong, China Tidal Wave, trans. by Matthew Dillon, Honolulu, University of
Hawaii Press, 2007. Extracts were published in French translation by Marie Holzman
in Perspectives chinoises, no. 4 (June 1992), pp. 58-61. See also: Rémi Quesnel,
“Wang Lixiong, an atypical intellectual,” China Perspectives , n° 50, Nov.-Dec. 2003.
Wang Lixiong, 
Wo de Xiyu, 
ni de Dong Tu,
Taipei, Dakuai
Wenhua (Locus
Publishing), 2007
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an), (4) and attempted suicide in a high-security prison in
Miquan before recanting and promising to collaborate in
order to obtain his release. He recorded the incident in a
short essay entitled Memories of Xinjiang (Xinjiang zhui-
ji), published in 2001 and reprinted as an introduction to
the present volume. The introduction is followed by three
other substantial sections. The first of these is a travelogue
of Wang’s four subsequent trips to Xinjiang between 2003
and 2006. It is followed by a long dialogue between Wang
and a Uyghur intellectual named Mokhtar, with whom he
shared a prison cell in 1999. The final part is comprised of
three “Letters to Mokhtar,” which conclude the conversa-
tion and sum up Wang’s main points regarding the difficul-
ties of Xinjiang independence. Wang Lixiong does not,
therefore, write as an academic, nor does he give much
background, even of a journalistic nature, but draws only on
his conversations with various people in Xinjiang. This is
inevitably problematic, especially as he does not speak
Uyghur and has to rely on various friends to translate. This
paper will therefore not attempt to bring much new materi-
al on Xinjiang into the discussion, but rather will assess how
Xinjiang is viewed by a critical Chinese intellectual. 
Wang’s 1999 trip to Xinjiang was funded by an independ-
ent think tank run by a friend identified as Q, previously a
member of the group of intellectuals counselling Zhao
Ziyang. In the introduction, Wang describes buying a car in
Ningxia and driving into Xinjiang with a Hui friend called
A-Ke. After meeting with several contacts, including a
Chinese official working in a government press agency and
an old cadre in the bingtuan administration referred to as J,
Wang, taking stock of their role in Xinjiang, (5) requests and
obtains from J an internal publication on the bingtuan,
which he photocopies at a friend’s office. Only afterwards
does he realise that he has probably been followed all along
by plainclothes police, and that the notes and interview log
he has left openly in his hotel rooms have probably been
thoroughly checked and read. As they are leaving Xinjiang,
when Wang and A-Ke stop for the night in Hami, their car
is confiscated under a pretext, and they are kept waiting
until the commanding officer arrives from Urumchi. Wang
is then formally accused of crimes against state security and
imprisoned. After attempting suicide, he is taken to a hos-
pital, then transferred to a high-security prison in Miquan,
where he shares a cell with a Han prisoner accused of eco-
nomic crimes (“Uncle Chen”), and a Uyghur prisoner
arrested in Beijing for organising a demonstration protesting
discrimination (Mokhtar). (6) Finally, he agrees to sign the
detailed statement of “collaboration” he is offered, includ-
ing a promise not to contact any other security services
(including the Beijing Public Security Bureau), thinking
that this will at least enable him to take care of some fami-
ly matters and do away with some compromising documents
before handing himself in again. On this occasion, he even
pokes fun at the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for its
“worship of the written word” (wenzi chongbai): “As
though when something has been written down it automat-
ically becomes the truth and can no longer be changed.”
In the form of memories of prison conversations with
Mokhtar, Wang Lixiong sketches out a preliminary analy-
sis of the “Xinjiang problem,” which he believes has
entered a phase of “Palestinisation.” He begins with some
anecdotal examples of what he calls the Han “colonial atti-
tude,” citing the resistance to “Urumchi time” (7) among
local Hans, and their worship of Wang Zhen (1908-1993),
Party secretary of Xinjiang from 1949 to 1955. (8) While in
Mao’s times all “nationalities” were submitted to equal
oppression, Wang concludes that since the 1990s, which
he isolates as a turning point, Uyghurs feel they have not
benefited from the same treatment as the Han. After
1989, the Centre adopted a “nip all destabilising elements
in the bud” policy (Ba yiqie bu wending de yinsu xiaomie
zai mengya zhuangtai, p. 66), and increasingly resorted to
pan-Chinese nationalism, strengthening the sympathies of
Xinjiang’s Han population, but increasingly alienating
Uyghurs. Wang writes: 
I have always been surprised at the government’s
wishful thinking in believing it could merge China’s
56 nationalities into one under the artificial concept
of “the Chinese nation” [Zhonghua minzu], and
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4. The XPCC or bingtuan was originally a paramilitary group founded to absorb the remnants
of the Republican army in Xinjiang in 1954. Tianshannet gives the 2003 population figure
of the XPCC as 2,542,000 (13 percent of the population of the Xinjiang), of which 88 per-
cent are Han Chinese. It is comprised of 14 divisions, directly administers five municipal-
ities, runs two universities, a TV channel, and a daily newspaper, and has 11 publicly trad-
ed subsidiaries. http://www.aboutxinjiang.com/index.htm (12 August 2008).
5. J’s assessment of the bingtuan’s role is characteristic: “The function of the bingtuan is to
guarantee that these 1.66 million km2 of land always retain the name ‘China’!” (p. 21).
6. Wang Lixiong also notes that having learned the prison rules by heart, he carefully tran-
scribed them on his computer once he returned to Beijing. One day, looking for the doc-
ument on his computer, he discovers it has been erased (p. 53).
7. In 1980, the Xinjiang People’s Congress decided to switch to “Urumchi time,” two hours
behind Beijing time, but abandoned the idea in the face of resistance by local Hans. 
8. When Wang Zhen, State Vice-President and one of the “Eight Immortals” (influential in the
1989 crackdown) died, his ashes were scattered in the Tianshan mountains in accor-
dance with his wishes. Uyghurs manifested their outrage by refusing to drink water from
the Tianshan, which they believed had been sullied. Wang Lixiong notes that they mani-
fest the same hostility toward Wang Lequan, whom they like to call Wang Shicai (a pun
on Sheng Shicai, the warlord who ruled Xinjiang from 1933 to 1944). Various anecdotes
illustrating the legendary brutality of Wang Zhen and Sheng Shicai are noted on p. 125.
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make them face the outside world with an identical
outlook. (…) On the contrary, each nationality can
also use nationalism for its own goals, strengthen its
internal cohesion through nationalism, and justify sep-
aratism and independence in its name.” (p. 59-60)
Wang shares the view of a nationalist or at least cultural-
nationalist revival in Chinese political discourse, initiated by
Deng Xiaoping and reinforced after 1989. One may note
that the main themes of this discourse (5,000 years of histo-
ry, the “humiliation” of the Opium War and imperialism,
anti-Japanese feelings) are not particularly conducive to
appropriation by other ethnic groups, and indeed are some-
times downright detrimental (e.g., the emphasis on the Qing
empire and the civilisation it purportedly brought to frontier
regions such as Xinjiang). In this sense, Wang believes that
the “Xinjiang problem” is largely a “self-fulfilling prophecy”
(p. 61) in which an important role was played by the famous
yet still mysterious “Document No. 7” issued in March
1996, the first to conflate separatism with “illegal religious
activity.” In this situation of mutual distrust, all efforts to
stimulate the economy, no matter how profitable, were
inevitably seen as colonialism. And in fact, Wang concludes
that Han inhabitants of Xinjiang were able to reap an over-
whelming share of the benefits. New Han farmers took over
the land from Uyghur farmers, effectively colonising
Xinjiang’s agriculture. From 1990 to 2000, according to offi-
cial statistics, the Han population in Xinjiang increased by
1.8 million people, or over 30 percent. O bs er va ti ons f rom  the f ie ld
Wang Lixiong subsequently returned to Xinjiang twice in
2003 (summer and fall) and twice in 2006 (spring and sum-
mer), and conducted a series of long interviews with Mokhtar
in his hometown of Aksu from April to October 2006. He
reports on deepening urban segregation and growing nepotism
and corruption, highlighting the monopoly on mineral water
held by Party Secretary Wang Lequan’s (9) son-in-law. Aksu is
entirely in Wang Lequan’s hands: the taxis of Aksu must join
his son-in-law’s corporation or face the non-renewal of their
licenses (p. 193), and all electric poles are imported from a
friend’s company in Shandong (Wang Lequan is a Shandong
native). The vice-mayor who must approve all real estate proj-
ects is himself a real estate developer from Wenzhou, and
reserves the most lucrative projects for himself; returning to
Aksu in 2006, Wang Lixiong finds that everything has been
torn down and rebuilt in “Wenzhou style” (p. 194). 
Wang goes on to highlight three main aspects of Xinjiang’s
socio-political system: the colonial economy and control of
resources by Han officials, the education system, and more
generally the politics of cultural uniformisation.
Co lon ia lis m
The bingtuan are characteristic of what Wang calls the colo-
nial economy of Xinjiang. Entirely controlled by Han offi-
cials, they exert severe pressure on cotton prices, forcing
impoverished farmers to sell cotton below market price for
the benefit of the bingtuan system. Wang concludes that the
system has no economic efficiency, and its continued exis-
tence is only justified to keep paying the pensions of its
430,000 retired workers, and more particularly as a rampart
against “instability.” (10) Thus, most of the interviewees he
speaks to clearly believe that the subsidies Xinjiang receives
from the Centre do not make up for the cheap “exports”
Xinjiang delivers to Eastern China. A friend called Z in
Urumchi points out that Xinjiang’s natural gas is sold for the
same price in Shanghai as in Xinjiang: the government thus
appropriates Xinjiang’s natural resources without offering
any form of reparation for the pollution and environmental
impact of resource exploitation (p. 246). Similarly, a farmer
near Yengisar points out that electricity costs 0.85
RMB/KWh, which is double the price in Beijing (p. 136). 
This feeling of exploitation and disenfranchisement is com-
pounded by the monopoly of positions of responsibility exer-
cised by Han officials, (11) who manipulate village elections,
use their positions to extend advantages to their family and
friends, and devise projects that are incomprehensible to
145N o  2 0 0 8 / 3
9. Politburo member Wang Lequan became deputy Party secretary for Xinjiang in 1992 and
acting secretary in 1994, and has served as full Secretary since 1995, in violation of the
official policy to rotate provincial secretaries at least every ten years.
10. Wang Lixiong quotes Zhang Qingli, then Commander (silingyuan) of the Xinjiang bing-
tuan: “As long as there are enemy forces in the world, as long as there are separatist
forces agitating in Xinjiang, as long as there is religious extremism brewing, the bing-
tuan will continue to exist forever, long live the bingtuan!” (p. 109). Zhang has now
become notorious for his comments as Party secretary of the Tibet autonomous region,
describing the Dalai Lama as “a jackal in Buddhist monk’s robes and an evil spirit with
a human face and the heart of a beast” in March 2008. Wang Lixiong specifically quot-
ed this sentence in his petition calling for an independent investigation in Tibet, as an
example of “Cultural Revolution language.” See “Twelve Suggestions for Dealing with
the Tibetan Situation, by Some Chinese Intellectuals,” The New York Review of Books,
vol. 55, no. 8 (15 May 2008), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21379. 
11. Wang gives three examples: in a village near Aksu without any Han inhabitants, most
cadres are Han; a sports teacher in Aksu describes his school, in which there is not a
single Han pupil but all cadres are Han, and the principal is the mistress of a high offi-
cial (p. 203); in Subash, there are no Han inhabitants in the village, but the Party secre-
tary is Han (p. 231). This monopoly of power positions by Han is borne out by research:
Nicolas Becquelin’s analysis of the 2000 Xinjiang Yearbook indicates that all 124 Party
secretaries at prefecture, municipal, and county levels are Han. “Staged Development in
Xinjiang,” China Quarterly, no. 178 (June 2004), p. 363.
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local farmers (p. 139). Mokhtar underlines that in a situa-
tion in which all local officials are Han, their distribution of
land leases always gives preferential treatment to their fami-
ly, friends and people from Eastern China, while the local
population feels progressively excluded from their land
(p. 380). By way of contrast, Wang has pointed out in his
research on Tibet that the key point of Zhao Ziyang’s good-
will policy of the early 1980s was forcing Han cadres to step
aside and hand over their positions to Tibetan cadres. (12)
Mokhtar emphasises that officials sent to Xinjiang have
always promoted their own interests. Huge building projects
are all carried out by companies from inner China who bring
their own migrant workers, preventing any trickle-down for
the local population from the “Great development of the
West” (Xibu dakaifa) policy (p. 278). China has the largest
highways in the world, he concludes: are they meant to
develop Southern Xinjiang or simply to allow the army bet-
ter control? (p. 278)
Ed uc at ion
The second point of interest to Wang is the school system,
which is starkly divided between Uyghurs who learn
Chinese (min kao Han) and those who take their schooling
in Uyghur (min kao min; see p. 55). Mokhtar’s friend G
points out that Uyghur teachers are routinely tested in
Chinese (they are requested to take the HSK or Hanyu
shuiping kaoshi), while Chinese teachers do not have to
learn Uyghur. The system of “bilingual classes,” in which
only Uyghur literature is taught in Uyghur, is currently being
generalised. Mokhtar outlines how “bilingual education,”
which began in 1997 as an experiment before being gener-
alised in 2004, is progressively eliminating Uyghur teachers.
In 2006, a cadre he picks up on the road confirms that
under the new education policy implemented since 2000,
80 percent of teaching is in Chinese, and all official meet-
ings are conducted in Chinese without translation, which
compounds the Han monopoly on power. Mokhtar adds that
the experiment has been extended to the university level,
and that Uyghur-language professors will also soon be elim-
inated. 
For Mokhtar, the Uyghurs are being assimilated (tonghua)
through the increasingly Chinese school system. His friend
points out that in Xinjiang University, over half the students
are Han, although it was specifically established for minori-
ties, and all classes must now be taught in Chinese (p. 213).
The official goal of “three 60 percents” in the recruitment
of students, workers, and soldiers (zhaosheng, zhaogong,
zhaobing, p. 323) is therefore far from being met. Mokhtar
underlines that minorities make up less than 10 percent of
PLA (People’s Liberation Army) troops stationed in
Xinjiang, and Han likewise hold 70 percent of cadre-level
positions (p. 324). Regarding university education, Han
graduates can apply for universities in other provinces, while
Uyghur graduates are only admitted to local universities; if
they want to go to Eastern China, they must take two or
three years of “preparatory classes” (yukeban) at Xinjiang
University or Xinjiang Teachers’ College. 
For all these reasons, tensions in schools run high. Wang
relates an anecdote about racist remarks in a classroom, (13)
concluding that colonial attitudes and racial discrimination
are widespread inside the school system and taken for grant-
ed by teachers and Han students. Mokhtar also particularly
resents the Han habit of requesting people to “be reason-
able” (jiang daoli). For this reason, a frequent phenomenon
is that parents who have gone through the min kao Han sys-
tem send their children to min kao min because of the dis-
crimination Uyghur children experience in Han language
classes (Uyghurs call min kao Han students the “14th minor-
ity” of Xinjiang, because they are neither Han nor
Uyghur (14)). Because of these political tensions, according to
Mokhtar, 30 to 40 percent of Uyghur children in rural areas
remain illiterate after their nine-year mandatory education
(p. 280). Finally, schools are used as a channel to imple-
ment religious policy: children must go to school on Fridays
during summer vacations (p.  133), and moustaches and
beards are banned among teachers. Of course, all forms of
religious activity are banned in schools (p. 232), which as
elsewhere in China are an important channel for ideological
indoctrination. A popular story tells how at one of the end-
less political discussion sessions at Xinjiang University, a
professor says, “What do you mean by saying that Xinjiang
has belonged to China for several thousand years? Several
tens of thousands of years back, even before apes had
changed into men, the Han apes came to Xinjiang to teach
the Uyghur apes how to eat peaches and pick leaves!” (p.
311)
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12. See Wang Lixiong, “Reflections on Tibet,” New Left Review, no. 14, March-April 2002. 
13. A teacher tells of a Han student who remarks in class that Xiangfei, the “Fragrant
Concubine,” a Uyghur princess sent to the emperor Qianlong, probably “smelled of mut-
ton.” When a Uyghur student subsequently asks the teacher to come and check whether
he also “smells of mutton,” the teacher requests his exclusion for improper behavior.
Finally, when the student’s father, who is a cadre, comes to school and slaps the teacher
in the face, the school backs down for fear of ethnic confrontation. (p. 205)
14. There are officially 13 minorities in Xinjiang. Wang expands on the unique position of
these “min kao Han” students, some of whom choose to assimilate entirely into Han cul-
ture, while others reject it strongly, becoming Uyghur nationalists (p. 207).
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C ul tur al  as si mi lati on
As he travels, Wang Lixiong carefully records the places in
which traditional Uyghur architecture and the way of life it
encapsulates is being destroyed. In Keping in 2006, he
describes how the local government has distributed a 3,000
RMB per household subsidy to build new houses, while the
strict regulations for construction can only be met by spend-
ing at least ten times this amount. As a result, people build
one room, leaving the construction to be completed when
they have more money (p. 210). In Urumchi the “night mar-
ket” and the “International Bazaar” are simply commercial
ploys for the city cadres to make money. In 2006 Wang
notes that not a single old building is left in Yining (p. 249):
“Just as though a railway track had been built.” Han inhab-
itants of Kashgar explicitly state that the destruction of old
houses is designed to persuade Uyghurs to leave the old city.
This phenomenon, which Wang calls “compoundisation”
(xiaoquhua), and which is not peculiar to Xinjiang, is
summed up in one sentence: “As for the loss of cultural
specificities and of a special living environment, the profit-
eager officials are not interested” (p. 257). Wang, on the
other hand, underlines that there should be no contradiction
between preserving traditions and enjoying comfortable liv-
ing conditions. He blames China’s political system for creat-
ing incentives only for “image projects” (xinxiang
gongcheng) to impress higher-ranking officials, and not to
meet the aspirations of ordinary citizens. T he  na ti ona lis t  v ie w
In his first conversation with Wang Lixiong, Mokhtar starts
out by defining the “Xinjiang problem” as three-dimension-
al: national, religious, and socio-economic. He distinguishes
between nationalists — mostly intellectuals who favour an
independent nation-state (30 percent, according to
Mokhtar); religious people who resent China’s state atheism
— mainly peasants (50 percent); and a relatively individual-
istic third group who are not interested in collective action,
but only in their own best interest. Mokhtar believes that few
people are happy with the present situation (5-10 percent)
and that therefore most fit into one of the three groups
(p. 265). 
According to Mokhtar, relations between the Han and
Uyghurs were good in the 1950s because the Han were so
few (150,000 in 1956, of which 100,000 were PLA troops,
p. 300), and they therefore had to learn Uyghur. Although
there was some immigration from Gansu during the great
famine of 1961-1962, and educated youths came from
Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution, a balance was
maintained. Nonetheless, beginning with the Anti-Rightist
Campaign, which was particularly strong in Xinjiang, the
Maoist state actively persecuted Uyghur culture: thousands
of intellectuals were imprisoned, and the one-third that sur-
vived were not freed until the late 1970s. In 1961-1962, a
violent campaign against “revisionists” also eliminated many
Uyghur intellectuals who had been educated in the Soviet
Union. During the Cultural Revolution, all Uyghur-language
manuals as well as the Koran were burnt, and the new writ-
ing system was established in 1962. Muslims were frequent-
ly forced to raise pigs (p. 301).
For that reason, Mokhtar believes, at the time of Opening
and Reform in the early 1980s, most intellectuals were will-
ing to cooperate with the government and follow China’s
road to scientific and economic development. He situates
the break occurring sometime in the 1990s, between the
Baren uprising in 1990 (15) and the Ghulja uprising in
1997 (16) (which many people believe to have discredited
peaceful resistance); Uyghurs suffered mass unemployment,
while more and more Han immigrants moved to Xinjiang
and took over their land. Mokhtar highlights that the bomb
attack on a bus in Urumchi in 1997 was timed to coincide
with the funeral ceremony of Deng Xiaoping (p. 356). At
this point, most intellectuals had come to believe that
China’s development was incompatible with progress for the
Uyghurs (p. 268). At the same time, the Chinese govern-
ment became more and more nationalistic, promoting the
idea of “Descendants of the Yellow Emperor” (Huang Yan
zhi sun), and in 1996 issuing “Document no. 7,” which
clearly targeted “splittism” and “illegal religious activity.”
Mokhtar consequently believes it was the nationalist turn of
the Chinese government that provoked Uyghur nationalism,
compounded by the repressive policy of the late 1990s
(“Beat down any head sticking out; do not slacken at any
cost,” or Lu tou jiu da, jue bu shou ruan). For the “unem-
ployment generation,” economic development has become syn-
onymous with ethnic discrimination. Mokhtar gives the exam-
ple of civil servant examinations: while Han people frequently
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15. On 5 April 1990, large-scale fighting took place between insurgents who are generally
associated with the East Turkestan Islamic Party and the PLA (more than 100 people are
believed to have died). According to Mokhtar, this was triggered by the forced abortion
of a three-month fetus to comply with birth control regulations. See Rémi Castets,
“Opposition politique, nationalisme et islam chez les Ouïghours du Xinjiang,” CERI
Working Papers, no. 110 (October 2004), p. 25. 
16. In February 1997, large numbers of young Uyghurs demonstrated in Ghulja (Yining).
Many were arrested and some killed by a wave of repression by the Chinese authori-
ties. See R. Castets, ibid., p. 29. 
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complain that Uyghurs are “uneducated” (suzhi di), he argues
that requirements for Uyghurs are actually much stricter. Many
Han officials are former soldiers, and since the Great
Development of the West policy, the government has encour-
aged graduates from professional middle schools (zhuanzhong
biye) to come to Xinjiang as voluntary teachers, giving them
civil servant status that Uyghurs have great difficulty obtaining. 
Mokhtar concludes that against a background of Chinese his-
tory, which he describes as a history of the assimilation of all
peripheral peoples (p. 396), and in a present context of gov-
ernment-sponsored cultural integration and government-
encouraged migration into Xinjiang, the only solution is to
advocate independence, which has become realistic in a post-
Soviet context. (17) While he wants to put a stop to new “immi-
gration,” he believes that a peaceful mode of coexistence can
be found with the Han population born and raised in
Xinjiang (who, according to him, in fact also resent the new
immigrants, p. 389). His model for the new state is an
American-style liberal democracy, neither Arab dictatorship
nor Islamic state (he believes the reforms needed to adapt
Islam to modern society are stifled by Arab dictators). In
response to Wang Lixiong’s questions, he concedes that
Uyghurs may have some sympathy for Osama Bin Laden,
but they don’t approve of him, because his attack on the Twin
Towers is seen as directed against capitalism; according to
Mokhtar, most Uyghurs, on the contrary, are for capitalism
and against communism (p. 376). Mokhtar’s model is a multi-
party system with free elections, a separation between state
and religion, and guarantees to safeguard the cultural rights of
Chinese populations, such as in education. (18)Wa ng Li xio ng a nd p ro gre ssi vedem oc ra cy
Wang Lixiong has some deep-set doubts, both about the prac-
ticality of independence as a goal for Xinjiang (due to the pres-
ence of a large Han population and their control of resources),
but also about the type of democracy that Mokhtar advocates.
In another text, he expresses his agreement with a draft
Constitution prepared by a group of dissidents (Yan Jiaqi and
others), under which Tibet would receive a high degree of
autonomy and the possibility to determine its own status after
25 years, while Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia would only be
granted the status of autonomy through a two-thirds vote in the
National People’s Congress. (19)
While Wang insists that he doesn’t mind one way or the
other whether Xinjiang becomes independent, he emphasis-
es alternatives to independence: the guarantee of genuine
religious freedom, and the possibility of controlling labour
migration by a work permit system that would apply to “cul-
tural protection zones” (including Tibet), and which would
serve to prevent desertification, degradation of the environ-
ment, and growing water shortages (p. 439). For Wang,
democratisation in China, as opposed to a higher degree of
autonomy, might be prone to nationalist manipulation and
internal fracturing. He therefore calls for an embrace of the
Dalai Lama’s “Middle Way” of a high degree of autonomy
within the framework of a federal China, going so far as to
propose that the Dalai Lama become the chairman of a pro-
visional government. 
Nonetheless, his three final “letters to Mokhtar” reveal
some of the deep-seated contradictions underpinning his
thoughts on political reform in China. The first letter is
devoted to the question of terrorism. A clear evolution can
be noted with regard to Wang’s first writings on Xinjiang in
1999, and also in comparison with his writings on Tibet.
While his understanding of the September 11 attacks on
the United States can at best be described as simplistic (an
attack on America supported by Arab popular opinion
because solidarity with Israel made America appear as the
source of all evils), the conclusions he draws for China are
in more of an apocalyptic mode, reminiscent of his science-
fiction novel Yellow Peril. Devoting an entire chapter to a
fantasy description of a terrorist attack on the Three Gorges
Dam by a lone diver with a nuclear backpack (p. 434), he
insists that Beijing should learn from 9/11 that even the
greatest power in the world is not immune to a terrorist
attack. It remains somewhat obscure why Wang Lixiong
believes Xinjiang would be more likely to resort to terrorism
than Tibet, and this whole concept seems steeped in scare-
mongering. (20)
In his second letter, he insists on Chinese nationalism. For
Wang, China did not experience the nation-state model
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17. In Mokhtar’s view, Mohamed Imin persuaded his Uyghur “compatriots” not to push for
independence after the Hotan uprising in 1931, on the grounds that the USSR would
swallow an independent Uyghur state. Therefore it was only after the dissolution of the
USSR that independence became possible (p. 378). There is much discussion of histor-
ical events at several places in the book, which unfortunately cannot be presented in
detail here. 
18. Mokhtar believes that, apart from cultural rights guaranteed by law, the fair representa-
tion of a Chinese minority in an independent Xinjiang can be ensured by reserving seats
for them in the electoral system. He proposes that the overwhelmingly Han bingtuan
should be transformed into counties (xian) electing delegates.
19. Wang Lixiong, “A Successive Multilevel Electoral System vs. a Representative
Democratic System: Relative advantages for resolving the Tibet Question,”
http://wlx.middle-way.net/?action=show&id=7 (1 June 2008). Wang Lixiong’s page and
the English translations posted on it no longer appear on Woeser’s blog (12 August
2008). The text is available in Chinese (“Zhuceng dijin zhi yu minzhu zhi: Jiejue Xizang
wenti de fangfa bijiao”) on Wang Lixiong’s new webpage : http://www.boxun.com/
hero/wanglx/6_1.shtml (19 September 2008). 
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before 1911, and at that time its first formulation included
Xinjiang and Tibet in Sun Yat-sen’s “Republic of five races”
(Han, Man/Manchu, Meng/Mongolian, Hui/Muslim,
Zang/Tibetan). He adds that nationalism has always been
an essential part of CCP ideology, and now the only portion
remaining. (21) For these two reasons he believes that democ-
ratisation would not necessarily solve the nationality question
(p. 444). Whereas the Soviet constitution, no matter how
misused, originally foresaw regional autonomy on paper by
virtue of its federal nature, Wang asserts that no similar pro-
vision exists in the PRC Constitution, and that as a result,
if China began unravelling, there would be no framework to
stop the process from spreading to Guangdong or Shanghai.
Conversely, he worries about an independent Xinjiang con-
tinuing to break down along ethnic lines into myriad
autonomous micro-states, underlining that Uyghurs represent
a majority of the population in only about one third of the
territory concentrated in Southern Xinjiang, where there is
no oil and resources. He wonders about the rights of the
Hui (although one could easily object that there are Dungan
populations in most of Central Asia), and highlights that
Tibet, by contrast, is practically a mono-ethnic area. This is
somewhat troubling, as in his articles on Tibet Wang argues
against the viability of Tibetan independence, despite its
ethnic homogeneity, on the grounds that the small Han elite
controls the most productive sectors of the economy and the
most dynamic groups in Tibetan society. (22)
Wang’s assertion about the lack of a legal framework is in
fact quite untrue: China’s Law on Regional Ethnic
Autonomy (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzu quyu
zizhifa), revised in 2001 and largely disseminated though a
2003 State Council White Paper on the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR), could provide a legal frame-
work for autonomy, even though it clearly remains a political
fiction at the present time (as was the Soviet constitu-
tion). (23) More largely, within the context of the internation-
al conventions ratified even by the present Chinese govern-
ment, as well as other international declarations, a stable
body of norms regarding minority rights and rights for indige-
nous populations would be available to guarantee either sub-
stantial autonomy for Uyghurs within China, or for Han
within an independent Xinjiang. 
Wang Lixiong seems to remain captive to conventional views
in China that describe international covenants as instru-
ments of power play: he describes them as merely a pretext
for American or Western intervention in Xinjiang aimed at
destabilising China, and quotes the theory of “precedence
of human rights over sovereignty” or renquan gaoyu
zhuquan. Finally, he concludes that even if Xinjiang were to
become independent, it would soon be re-conquered, again
reasoning in terms that are perhaps too exclusively deter-
mined by “realist” paradigms of international relations. In
the same way, he concludes that the unravelling of the
Soviet Union was “in the interest” (hesuan) of Russians,
because Russia represented three quarters of the land but
only half the population, while in China, the opposite is
true: the Han are a majority in only 40 percent of the terri-
tory of the People’s Republic, while they represent over 90
percent of population. The most worrying aspect here is
probably that Wang Lixiong gives no positive reasons in
favour of autonomy; he never mentions the benefits of eco-
nomic integration, common language, or market opportuni-
ties, but only insists on a series of probably exaggerated dan-
gers, and thus eschews the dispassionate discussion of
advantages and drawbacks that he himself advocates. 
His third letter deals with his system of proposed “progres-
sive democracy” (dijin minzhu) and the implicit critique of
liberal democracy it contains. Wang calls the latter “forum
democracy” (guangchang minzhu, p. 457), and believes it
can only exacerbate interethnic tensions, which will be
fanned by the elite, a phenomenon not unknown in “mature
democracies” (he cites support for the Iraq war). “Large-
scale democracy” (daguimo minzhu) will polarise political
debate and lead straight to fascism (p. 460), as opinion lead-
ers in Xinjiang will want to settle scores with China, the
media will pour oil on the fire to make money, and the
“masses,” who love heroes and lofty speeches, will follow
populists and opportunists. Nonetheless, he sees democracy
as the key to resolving ethnic conflicts, the problem being
not democracy itself but “large-scale democracy.” Therefore,
Wang goes over old ground by proposing a system of indi-
rect elections, based on natural villages, in which votes
would take place by household, each household selecting
one representative (one wonders how women would fare in
this system of representation), thereby allowing for direct
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20. There are indeed many government reports on terrorist attacks in Xinjiang, but very few
are independently corroborated, and many are contested by Uyghur groups overseas. An
interesting example is the recent questioning of the August 2008 attack on military
policeman in Kuqa. See Edward Wong, “Doubt Arises in Account of an Attack in China,”
New York Times, 29 September 2008. 
21. In the first part of the book, Wang Lixiong goes so far as to contend that nationalism has
entirely replaced ideology in the 1990s (p. 51).
22. Wang Lixiong, “A Successive Multilevel Electoral System vs. a Representative
Democratic System: Relative advantages for resolving the Tibet Question,” art. cit.
23. The Autonomy Law is available on http://www.gov.cn/test/2005-07/29/con-
tent_18338.htm. See also: Information Office of the State Council, “History and
Development of Xinjiang,” May 2003, http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2003-
06/12/content_916306.htm. 
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deliberative democracy by consensus. The elected represen-
tative automatically becomes a voter on the higher level, and
so on, preserving the direct and participatory nature of
democracy (p.  464). In fact, this blueprint clearly reveals
Wang Lixiong’s misgivings about representation and vote by
majority. (24) He favours consensus over voting, pointing out
that all elections are problematic, even in the United States
(the 2000 presidential election inevitably comes up), not to
mention in a Tibetan village in which a majority of inhabi-
tants are illiterate. 
Although he writes that in this system policy decisions on
various levels should not interfere, he gives no guiding prin-
ciple, not even a philosophical one, to explain how responsi-
bility should be divided. The implicit assumption is, in fact,
that voters are not qualified to deal with any matters beyond
their immediate experience, and that the only decisions
taken on each level are those that directly affect the life of
the constituency. “Regarding larger matters that go beyond
the borders of their immediate experience, it is very difficult
for the masses to gain a correct grasp” (p. 466). This is in
fact a highly elitist system, the most worrying aspect of
which is that it relies on the spontaneous generation of a
social elite to foster democracy, rather than on an institution-
alised system of checks and balances. Although Wang insists
that this system will ensure that China does not break apart
by guaranteeing both autonomy and cohesion (p. 468), one
cannot help but wonder whether China and Xinjiang would
not be better served at the outset by a full implementation of
China’s own Autonomy Law, to be completed by other guar-
antees of the rights of minorities as set out in international
laws and norms. Interestingly enough, while he is so wary of
representative democracy, Wang Lixiong entirely trusts his
own electoral system to guarantee individual and collective
rights by its intrinsic mechanisms rather than by formalised
norms (p. 469).
For these reasons, although Wang Lixiong has gone further
than most Chinese intellectuals in exploring the rights and
claims of ethnic minorities and how they fit into the political
problems of China as a whole, his newest book remains
somewhat disappointing. It is true that he paints a sympa-
thetic portrait of “ordinary Uyghurs,” far removed from the
usual clichés of official discourse, exoticism, or commonly
repeated slurs — an important accomplishment that may act
as a bridge towards even-minded ordinary Han Chinese cit-
izens. But just as he portrayed Tibetans as prone to blindly
following Maoism as a new religion during the Cultural
Revolution, smashing their own temples and Buddhas, and
then blindly reviling Mao when he proved not to have been
a god after his death, (25) his view of Uyghur intellectuals as
influenced by terrorism and Islam seems excessively cultural-
ist in relation to modern, secular Xinjiang. His analyses of
several issues appear uninformed. Leaving aside academic
research, he is particularly weak on government policy; an
analysis of Hu Jintao’s readily available 2005 speech to the
State Commission on Ethnic Affairs could have yielded
important insights: one of Hu’s central tenets is that any
form of increased autonomy remain subordinate to the
“three inseparables.” (26)
Nonetheless, Wang’s openness to dialogue and public dis-
cussion of his ideas, without any taboos or prerequisites, is
certainly an important step towards weaving the concerns of
Uyghurs or Tibetans into the debate on the democratisation
of China — taking into account, of course, that the present
book cannot be published on the mainland. In this capacity,
as also demonstrated by his March 2008 initiative on Tibet,
Wang Lixiong is one of the closest examples of a public
intellectual in China. In this context, his writings also
demonstrate that, despite what the Chinese government
publicly states, there is no consensus in China over the fact
that no price is too high to ensure that the CCP remains the
dominant force in Xinjiang or Tibet. His ideas may even
trickle, gradually and windingly, to the corridors of power.
Wang Lixiong opposes independence for both Xinjiang and
Tibet, but his willingness to discuss practical measures such
as migration restrictions or enhanced religious freedom also
serves as a reminder that Chinese intellectuals are not nec-
essarily Han nationalists. •
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24. Interestingly, though perhaps not unsurprisingly, this type of institutional arrangement
has been proposed by thinkers critical of both “Western democracy” and their own gov-
ernments. To give two examples, the conservative revolutionary Zhang Binglin (1868-
1936) favoured this type of system to avoid the “feudal” nature of parliamentary repre-
sentation. Alexander Solzhenitsyn also advocated a similar arrangement based on tra-
ditional Russian zemstvo assemblies.
25. This is the object of the debate between Wang Lixiong and Tsering Shakyar. See Wang
Lixiong, “Reflections on Tibet,” art. cit., and the rebuttal: Tsering Shakyar, “Blood in the
Snow,” New Left Review, no. 15, May-June 2002. The gist of Tsering Shakyar’s argu-
ment is that Mao-worship in Tibet was no more blind than elsewhere in China, and that
traditional Tibetan society remained dynamic and changing despite its religious charac-
teristics. Woeser also documents the importance of the Mao-cult among Tibetans in
Shajie: Forbidden Memory: Tibet during the Cultural Revolution (Taipei, Dakuai wenhua,
2007). 
26. The “three inseparables” (sange libukai) are: the Han cannot be separated from minori-
ties, the minorities cannot be separated from the Han, and the minorities cannot be sep-
arated one from another. See: “Hu Jintao zai Zhongyang minzu gongzuo huiyi shang de
jianghua” [Hu Jintao’s Speech at the Central Nationalities Working Committee], May 27,
2005, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/3423605.html (12 August 2008).
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